Most of this is already law, for one trade, in twenty-seven countries
The usual objection to RVW-5 is that no government would ever agree to it. One has, since 2006, across the whole union.
The objection this lab hears most is that asking authorities to publish a dated, identified, machine-readable list of who holds a licence is politically naive. It is worth knowing that the European Union decided to require almost exactly that, for statutory auditors, in a directive adopted in 2006 and operational everywhere by June 2009.
Read what it actually requires. Every member state must enter approved auditors and audit firms in a public register. Each auditor and each firm must be identified by an individual number. Registration information must be stored in electronic form and be electronically accessible to the public. The register must be updated without undue delay after notification of a change. Auditors from outside the union must be flagged in the register as such rather than shown as statutory auditors. Sanctions must be disclosed publicly, and must include the possibility of withdrawing approval. The reason given in the recitals is the plainest sentence in the whole instrument: in order to protect third parties.
Set beside RVW-5, that is tier A and most of tier B. A stable identifier per holder. Machine accessibility as a legal duty rather than a favour. Prompt updates. Published revocation. The only missing piece is the one this lab keeps returning to: the directive does contemplate electronic signatures, but on the information the auditor sends to the authority, not on what the authority publishes back out. The submission is signed. The register is not.
Italy did something adjacent and arguably harder. Its national index of digital domiciles holds a certified electronic address for every company in the business register and every professional enrolled in an order, fed by the orders themselves, free to consult without any credential, with the code stating that consultation of those registers is not subject to authentication and that the lists are produced in open format. For an enrolled professional that address is a legal domicile, not a contact detail.
So the political argument is already won twice over, in one trade across a continent and in one country across every regulated profession. What was never asked for, in either case, is the thing that makes a published record usable by a stranger: a signature on the artefact. That is not a legislative problem. It is a key, a DNS record and a cron job, and it is the part this lab can actually help with.
If you work on audit oversight or on digital domicile policy and think this reading of either instrument is wrong, the correction is worth more to this lab than another row in the index.